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Korea’s current Green Growth strategy seeks to lessen the country’s dependence on fossil 
fuel resources and promote significant investment into the development of alternative, 
environmentally-friendly energy sources. As part of this strategy Korea has been investing 
heavily in the development of various green energy industries in particular it has become one 
of the world’s largest manufacturers of lithium based rechargeable-ion batteries to power 
electric or hybrid motor vehicles. The continued growth of this industry requires a secure and 
stable supply of lithium and to this end the Korean government has developed its so-called 
“resource diplomacy” strategy which is designed promote relations with countries with 
significant lithium deposits such as Chile, Argentina and Bolivia. However, to date, resource 
diplomacy has been somewhat narrowly targeted at domestic policies that support Korean 
firms to invest directly in acquiring and developing lithium mines or to increasing the number 
of embassies in these countries. More recently the Korean government is considering broader 
diplomatic measures. The paper argues that resource diplomacy has the potential to be an 
effective means of achieving Korea’s green growth objectives but that the success of this 
strategy must go beyond facilitating Korean direct foreign investment to become a more fully 
fledged cultural and foreign aid and development diplomacy strategy that promotes longer 
term, broader and deeper levels of engagement. This ‘soft-power’ approach is more likely to 
serve as an effective but subtle means to exert influence not only to promote specific Korean 
interests but to achieve longer term, mutually beneficial outcomes for both Korea and these 
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Introduction  
China’s move to block exports of rare earth metals to Japan following a territorial argument 
over the Senkaku Islands in September 2010 sent shockwaves throughout the region and, in 
particular, its resource poor neighbour South Korea (hereafter referred to as Korea). 
Committed to the so-called “Green Growth Strategy” that seeks to develop a range of greener 
industries, the precariousness of the supply of key inputs into these industries such as rare 
earths  metals has the potential to derail some of the Green Growth Strategy’s ambitious 
targets. More generally it underscored how disruptions in supply of a range of metals can 
threaten the viability of Korea’s emerging industries for example how disruption in the 
supply of lithium could affect the development of Korea’s growing lithium-based 
rechargeable battery industry. In this context, Korea has made the diversification of resources 
supply a priority. To this end the Korean government has developed its so-called “resource 
diplomacy” strategy which is designed promote relations with countries with significant 
lithium deposits in particular Chile, Argentina and Bolivia.  
 
This paper analyses why the sales of eco-friendly vehicles and lithium-ion rechargeable 
batteries are significant for the realisation of Korea’s low carbon and green growth targets. 
Secondly, it examines the state of development of lithium-ion rechargeable battery 
technologies and the implications for the Korean battery industry. Finally, it examines how 
the Korea’s resource diplomacy has been applied to securing lithium in South America’s 
“Lithium Triangle” that falls within the borders of Chile, Argentina and Bolivia.  The paper 
finds that, to date, resource diplomacy has been somewhat narrowly targeted at domestic 
policies that provide Korean firms with funds and special loans to support their acquisition 
and development of South American lithium mines. The other most significant initiative is 
the increase in the number of Korean embassies in these countries.  The paper argues that 
securing a stable supply of key mineral inputs such as lithium will require more than 
facilitating Direct Foreign Investment and must expand Korean investment in areas such as 
the arts, education but in particular targeting Korea’s official development assistance (ODA) 
to investment in economic reconstruction and development projects such as those that 
develop local infrastructure and communications. The paper argues that while coordinating 
resource diplomacy with international development efforts is an approach adopted by others 
countries competing for resources, in particular Japan and China, given its history, Korea is 
well placed to share its experience and expertise with developing countries and has greater 
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capacity to being perceived as a “benign middle power” by recipient countries holding 
relevant mineral resources, and can further leverage that position to avoid accusations of neo-
colonialism. This approach has the potential to be successful and valuable with regard to 
relations with Bolivia. Like Korea Bolivia has a troubled colonial past. It is also South 
America’s poorest country and thus requires greatest international development assistance. 
Bolivia also possesses the world’s largest untapped lithium reserves. 
 
Korea’s Green Growth Strategy 
Korea is heavily dependent on imported fuel to meet its energy needs in particular relying on 
imported fossil-fuel based energy resources. In 2007 Korea was the 10th largest energy 
consuming country in the world (EIA, 2007; Lee et al., 2008: 284) with 97 percent of its total 
energy consumption being sourced from overseas (EIA, 2007; Lee et al., 2008: 284). It is 
estimated that 84 percent of this energy supply is in the form of fossil-based energy resources 
(Presidential Commission on Green Growth, ROK, 2010: 13). In 2009, the country was the 
fifth largest importer of crude oil and the second largest importer of both coal and liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) in the world (EIA, 2010).  
 
Fossil fuel dependence has increased Green House Gas (GHG) emissions at a constant rate 
with Korea far above the world average in both absolute GHG emissions and emissions per 
capita. From 1990 to 2009, Korea’s GHG emissions rose 118 percent and in 2009 the country 
was ranked 8th in the world in terms of GHG emissions (Kang, 2011: 120-21). The world 
average emission per capita in 2009 was 4.5 tons, while in Korea the amount was 2.5 times 
that at 10.9 tons.  
 
To maintain sustainable economic growth while mitigating GHG emissions, on 15 August 
2008, at a national address on the 60th anniversary of the Republic, President Lee Myung-
Bak, announced a new national policy called the “low carbon and green growth strategy”. Six 
months later, in January 2009, the government responded to the Global Financial Crisis 
induced recession in Korea with an economic stimulus package equivalent to US$38.1 billion 
80 percent of which was allocated to the development of more efficient usage of resources 
such as freshwater, waste, energy-efficient buildings, renewable energies, low-carbon 
vehicles, and the development of an energy efficient high speed rail network (United Nations 
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Environment Programme, 2010). 1 This investment in green growth was the highest ratio 
among comparable stimulus packages from other G20 governments. 
 
Part of the Green Growth strategy is to implement measures that have the potential to lessen 
the country’s dependence on fossil fuel resources and thereby reduce current emission levels. 
Korea ratified the Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change in 2002 as a non-Annex I country, meaning that it had no obligation to set a specific 
GHG emission reduction targets during the period 2008 to 2012 (Jones and Yoo, 2010: 9). 
Nevertheless, in 2009, the Korean government announced a mid-term mitigation target for 
GHG emission reduction of 30 percent (Woo, 2010: 19). The Korean government also 
announced that it aims to increase the portion of domestic renewable energy consumption to 
5 percent by 2011 and 9 percent by 2030. This target is ambitious given that in 2006, Korea’s 
renewable energy accounted for only 2.26 percent of primary energy consumption (Kang, 
2008: 7).  
 
World Lithium-ion Battery and Vehicle Markets and Korea’s Green Growth Strategy 
Another key aspect of the Green Growth Strategy is to mitigate emissions through the 
development of alternative energy sources. In this context, the development of the battery 
industry to power more environmentally friendly vehicles is seen as particularly important. 
Widespread uptake of electric or hybrid vehicle technology is seen not only as a means of 
lowing carbon emissions domestically but, through export and significant uptake in overseas 
markets, reducing emissions globally. The development of this export industry is also seen as 
a means of driving future domestic economic growth.  
 
Currently nickel metal hydride batteries power most hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs). The 
main limitations of currently nickel metal hydride batteries are high cost (about the same as a 
small car in 2009) and the relatively short driving distance achievable on a single charge 
                                                          
1 It should be noted that the genuine “greenness” of some of these initiatives has been questioned. For example 
environmental groups have criticised the government spending of USD20 billion on a plan to develop Korea’s 
four major river systems — the Han, Nakdong, Geum, and Youngsan — with the stated goals of preventing 
water shortages, improving water quality, bolstering flood control, and creating “eco-friendly culture spaces” for 
tourism. However, these groups argue that the project is not a genuine green initiative but a rebranding of an 
earlier Lee Myung-bak Pan Korean Waterway policy which sought to stimulate the local construction industry 
as it involves extensive dredging of waterways and the building of up to 16 new dams. Critics claim that this 
will further erode dwindling habitat and put added stress on the country's remaining wildlife (O’Donnell, 2010: 
3; Card 2009).  
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(Lim, 2009: 2). The development of the electric vehicle industry thus requires new 
generations of electric vehicles (EVs) and HEVs with smaller and lighter weight batteries that 
can store more energy (Bruce, 2008: 752). The continued development of rechargeable 
technologies will however increasingly rely on the supply of various metals including lithium, 
chrome, manganese, molybdenum, cobalt, tungsten, indium, rare-earth elements, magnesium 
and titanium (Kim, H., 2010: 13). However lithium, the lightest metal with half the density of 
water, is the core raw material required for the production of latest generation of rechargeable 
batteries. Compared to nickel metal hydride batteries, lithium-ion batteries are lighter, 20 
percent smaller and much more energy efficient (Gruber and Medina, 2010: 1). As a result, 
the market for lithium-ion batteries has increased dramatically driven by continuing 
improvement in electric-car and battery storage technologies as well as a drop in the price of 
these batteries and the vehicles in recent years (Kim, Y., 11/11/2010; Bok, 2011). 
 
Demand for lithium has only increased significantly in recent years. The consumption of 
lithium in the world increased less than 100 tons per annum in the early 1990s to just over  
70,000 tons per annum in 2000 (Ebensperger et al., 2005: 218). At this time the main uses for 
lithium were – batteries: 25 percent; ceramic and glass: 18 percent; lubricating greases: 12 
percent; pharmaceuticals and polymers: 7 percent; air conditioning: 6 percent; primary 
aluminium production: 4 percent; continuous casting: 3 percent: chemical processing, 3 
percent and others: 22 percent (Jaskula, 2008: 44.2). However in 2007, batteries became the 
leading end use for lithium for the first time and by 2011 lithium-ion batteries accounted for 
76 percent of the global rechargeable batteries market, which was worth an estimated 
USD18.3 billion (Jaskula, 2008: 44.2). By 2020 this market is expected to increase to 
USD95.4 billion. The growth the industry has driven increased prices and with the price of 
lithium carbonate rising from USD1.49 per kg in 2001 to USD6.00 per kg in 2009 (Shultz, 
2010: 14). Demand is being driven by the significant increase in the quantities of lithium 
required for rechargeable ion batteries to power EVs and HEVs. Unlike lithium batteries used 
in mobile information technology (IT) devices, EVs and HEVs batteries require much larger 
storage capacity and one EVs or HEV battery is equivalent in size to approximately 4,000 to 
5,000 mobile phone batteries (Lim, 2009: 1).  
 
With the continued tightening of environmental regulations, the green car market is expected 
to grow rapidly (Lim 2009: 1). Sales of lithium batteries for HEVs and EVs only began in 
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2009 and current demand for HEVs and EVs batteries remains relatively weak (Lowe et al., 
2010: 21). However, this is likely to change and some analysts estimate that the share of 
HEVs and EVs in the global auto market will grow to between 18-50 percent of total sales by 
2020 (Bok 2011:6). The Boston Consulting Group (2010: 7) forecasts that 26 percent of the 
new cars sold in the world market in 2020 – or approximately 14 million cars – will have 
electric or hybrid power engines and that the global market for lithium-ion rechargeable 
batteries that power them is expected to reach USD60 billion (Boston Consulting Group, 
2010: 8). A summary of some of the predictions for the “green cars” market is shown in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Outlook on Sales of Eco-Friendly Vehicles in 2020 
Forecasters (year) 
 




Deutsche Bank (2009)  
 
19.6% US: 23%, EU: 37%, Japan: 
34%, China 20%, Others: 
5.2% 
Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry of Japan (2010) 
20~50% 50~70% in 2030 
 
Huji Economic Research 
Institute (2010) 
18% EVs: 9.4%, plug-in hybrids : 
11.5% 
 





Source: Bok (2011: 7)  
 
The Development of Lithium Rechargeable Battery Technologies and the EV and HEV 
Industry in Korea 
Japanese manufacturers have had a solid lead in the global lithium battery market for the last 
20 years. The first lithium battery was produced in Japan in 1973 (Ogawa, 1985).  In 1991 the 
Japanese company Sony further developed lithium-ion rechargeable battery technology and 
introduced the first batteries to the world market (Nishi, 2001; Bruce, 2008). As a pioneer of 
this technology Japan became the world leader in the development of four key lithium cell 
materials: anodes, cathodes, electrolytes and separators and dominated the lithium-ion battery 
world market (Takehara and Kanamura, 1993; Tanaka et al., 2001; Lowe et al., 2010). 
However in the last decade many other countries have entered the battery manufacturing 
markets and currently the market share for the batteries industry is as follows: Japan, 56 
percent, Korea, 23.9 percent, China, 12.3 percent and others, 7.7 percent (Lowe et al., 2010: 
19).   
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Of these countries Korea has made the most significant advances in lithium-ion rechargeable 
battery manufacturing technology and replaced Japan as the world leader in the production of 
mid to small sized lithium-ion batteries. In 2010, 11 years since Korea began making the 
batteries, Samsung SDI overtook Panasonic’s subsidiary Sanyo Electric, to become the 
world’s top manufacturer with LG Chem climbing to the third place. This market trend is 
expected to continue with Korean companies estimated to account for 38.5 percent of the 
global markets compared to 38.4 percent for Japan by the end of 2011 (Brown, 06/04/2011).  
 
Korea’s largest chemical company, LG Chem, has been a particularly aggressive investor in 
the battery industry and announced that it plans to be the world’s number one vehicle battery 
maker by 2015 (Kim, Y., 06/04/2011). In 2011 it officially opened the world’s largest electric 
vehicle battery plant in the Korean city of Ochang, the first of three plants LG Chem plans to 
build over the next few years. The company predicts that the Ochang plant will have 
sufficient production capacity to supply batteries to 100,000 electric vehicles per annum. One 
of LG Chem main competitors, Samsung SDI, has also decided to establish production 
facilities which it predicts will be able to produce 33.6 million units of batteries for electric 
vehicles by 2015 (Hwang, et al., 11/04/2011). However, despite their status in the world 
lithium-ion battery market as number one and three, LG Chem and Samsung SDI continue to 
rely on importing a significant portion of inputs from Japan which accounts for nearly 80 
percent of their manufacturing costs. There are several steps involved in manufacture of 
lithium batteries. The first step is to procure lithium and to refine it into a white powder 
called “lithium carbonate” a process that generally occurs at the mine site. The lithium 
carbonate is then sent to Tier 2 or 3 manufacturers, which convert lithium carbonate into 
lithium metal which can then be used in battery cells and to make other components for 
lithium batteries. Finally, Tier 1 manufacturers assemble the individual cells and components 
from Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers into battery packs ready for placement in motor vehicles 
(Canis, 2011: 14). To date Korean participation in the battery market has been generally 
limited to that of Tier 3. To increase Korea’s net profits in the world lithium-ion battery 
market, Korea’s manufacturers of cell materials are gearing up their efforts to overtake 
Japanese rivals by focussing their efforts on narrowing the technological gap with Japanese 
manufacturers by developing their capacity to produce three of the four key materials: 
cathodes, separators and electrolytes (Kang et al., 17/05/2011). 
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Korea’s capacity to manufacture EVs and HEVs also continues to grow significantly. The Korean 
government estimates that within two years Korea will produce 1.4 million electric vehicles per 
annum of which 1 million will be made for export (Ministry of Knowledge Economy, 2010; Yi, 
19/01/2010). As shown in Table 2, LG Chem has already secured 10 carmakers as battery clients 
including General Motors (GM), Ford Motor, Renault, Hyundai Motors and Kia Motors. Also the 
company has signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Changan New Energy 
Automobile Co., a subsidiary of the major Chinese automaker Changan Automotive Group, to 
cooperate in the development of the electric vehicle battery sector (Moon and Kim, 05/02/2010). 
Samsung aims to be the main car battery supplier to 15 to 20 global car companies by 2015 and 
BMW, Chrysler, Delphi and S&T Motors are on Samsung’s current client list as shown in Table 2 
(Hwang, et al., 11/04/2011).  
 
Table 2: Major Battery Clients of LG Chem and Samsung in April, 2011 
Battery Maker  LG Chem  Samsung  
Clients (Car Makers) Ford Motor 
Renault 
GM  
Hyundai Motor  




S&T Motors  
Source: News Reports  
 
Korean companies and the resources race  
South Korea is engaged in a sustained drive to buy up foreign natural resources, ranging from 
rare earths to oil fields, to supplement its meagre domestic fuel reserves, secure supplies of 
key input for industry and lessen exposure to the shocks of price volatility common in 
commodities cycle. To do this South Korean companies have found themselves in a 
competitive race against its neighbours to secure these natural resources in particular vis-a-vis 
China as Chinese interests have dramatically increased their investment in overseas energy 
acquisitions. In recent years Korean companies have been scouring the world to secure 
energy assets and according to Bloomberg, in 2009 South Korean companies made 30 bids 
for foreign natural resources assets (Kang 2010). According to the Australian Financial 
Review’s Deallogic database in 2010, Korean companies have announced a record $7.6 
billion worth of mergers and acquisitions involving natural resources targets, two-thirds of 
which have been cross-border deals (AFR, 2010).  Some analysts argue that this aggressive 
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Korean investment in energy sources has driven up the price of these assets as Korean players 
have overpaid for big overseas acquisitions in their rush to clinch the deals amid heated 
competition with richer neighbours. Some of the recent major deals include SK Networks 
purchase of a stake of between 11 per cent and 14 per cent of the Brazilian mining company 
MMX for about USD700 million. POSCO and Korea National Oil Corp have also beefed up 
their efforts to secure a stable supply of raw materials and both plan to nearly double their 
spending on overseas energy projects and acquisitions to USD12 billion in 2011 (Song 2010). 
It should be noted that this was small in comparison to China as it is estimated that in 2010 
China's oil and gas acquisitions alone totalled USD24.3 billion in deals, up from USD17.1 
billion in 2009 (Dealogic AFR 2011). 
Securing lithium through resources diplomacy 
Chile, Australia, China and Argentina account for more than 95 percent of current global 
lithium output. Chile has been the world’s number one producer of lithium carbonate since 
1997 (Jaskula, 2008; 2010; 2011). In 2009, the country contributes to 89 percent and 80 
percent of total lithium imports to Korea and Japan respectively. However, a significant 
amount of the world’s lithium deposits are found in Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, and Australia 
(Jaskula, 2011). Indeed more than 50 percent of the world’s accessible lithium or 19 million 
tons of lithium is buried in an area known as “the Lithium Triangle”, bordered by three South 
American salt flats, Salar de Atacama in Chile, Salar del Hombre Muerto in Argentina and 
Salar de Uyuni in Bolivia (Gruber and Medina, 2010: 12; Jaskula, 2010; 2011). In 2008, this 
Triangle produced 55 percent of global production, even though Bolivia has yet to become a 
producer. Nevertheless with its significant deposits, Bolivia has potential to produce a 
massive amount of lithium carbonate in the future (Shultz, 2010: 16).   
 
In order to diversify supply and reduce vulnerability to resource price fluctuations the world’s 
major lithium importers including Korea, China and Japan have been exploring ways to 
develop and exploit the Lithium Triangle’s production capacity. In the case of Korea, since 
the beginning of his presidency in 2007 President Lee Myun Bak, a former CEO of a major 
resource importer, Hyundai Engineering and Construction, has emphasized the importance of 
natural resources and vigorously pursued a strategy known as “resource diplomacy”. Part of 
this approach has involved senior officials touring resource-rich countries to strengthen ties 
and facilitate bilateral cooperation for the natural resource industry. Many senior politicians 
and government officials have been vocal in their support of the policy. President Lee’s older 
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brother of Lee Sang-deuk, a Grand National Party lawmaker and Park Geun-hye, the former 
leader of the Grand National Party, have voiced their support of the policy, and former Prime 
Minister Han Seung-soo has even dubbed the “resource minister” by the Korean Press (Koo 
and Shin 2009). Park Young-jun, the deputy head of state affairs, has also been a strong 
supporter of the president’s initiatives, and several South Korean diplomats have been 
involved in the effort. In May 2008 21 South Korean diplomats were reassigned posts 
moving from embassies in Western countries, including France and Germany, to energy-rich 
countries in Africa, the Middle East and South America in order to establish permanent bases 
from which they could strengthen existing diplomatic missions. “Diplomats in those areas are 
now able to provide prompt updates on the current status of natural resources development in 
those countries,” said diplomat Cho Hyun (Koo and Shin 2009). In another effort to bolster 
cooperation with Latin America in renewable energy, agricultural development and 
infrastructure, in September 2010, the Foreign Ministry dispatched the so-called “Latin 
America Economic Cooperation Caravan” to Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay on to discuss 
ways to “lay the foundation for Korean firms’ entry into their markets and to work more 
closely together” (Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2010). The Caravan 
delegation comprised 35 foreign ministry officials, businessmen and traditional Korean music 
performers and visited cities and/or provinces in each of the countries and met with high-
ranking officials. The delegation also held a conference on agricultural expertise with 
agriculture experts and gathered information on the host countries’ agriculture and renewable 
energy sectors to look into the possibility of Korean firms’ entry into the markets of the 
countries (Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2010). 
 
Domestically a key approach in this strategy is through promotion of Korean Direct Foreign 
Investment in resource rich areas, a strategy outlined in the Ministry of Knowledge 
Economy’s (MKE) 4th Overseas Resource Development Plan (2010-2019). This Plan set a 
target that by 2019 Korea will achieve to secure the 26 percent of lithium consumption 
through the Korean companies’ owned overseas lithium mines. To this end the MKE has 
allocated funding to Korean companies to purchase and develop mines and in 2010 assisted 
with an overall investment of USD12 billion in overseas resource development projects 
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Korea’ Resources Diplomacy and Chile’s Lithium Market  
Chile has large deposits of lithium and highly developed mining and transport infrastructure 
and supplies more than 40 percent of lithium in the world market (Valda, 8/03/2011). Korea 
is particularly dependent on Chilean supply and imported 89 percent of total lithium from 
Chile in 2009 (Park et al., 16/08/2010). Japan has also imported more than 80 percent of its 
lithium imports from Chile (Kogure and Kamiya, 10/12/2010). 
 
Diplomatic relations between Korea and Chile were established in 1962 and for many years 
focused primarily on political issues such as the promotion of democratic values in the world.  
A significant milestone in the relations between the two countries was the finalisation of a 
free trade agreement (FTA), which became operative on April 1, 2004. Korea has since 
utilised this agreement to secure energy resources including lithium (Chacon, 2008: 11). The 
FTA has also facilitated Korean firm involvement in exploration and development of lithium 
deposits in Chile. 
 
Until recently Korean firms had only won the rights to explore certain sites. To increase 
Korea’ reliability of supply of lithium, in 2010 a consortium led by the state-run resource 
company, Korea Resources Corporation (KORES) acquired a 30 percent stake in Chile’s 
Atacama lithium project which is currently the largest lithium mine in the world (Park and 
Song, 15/11/2010). The Korean group’s paid USD190 million for its stake with the state-run 
company owning 12 percent and Samsung 18 percent, respectively. The deal marks the first 
time that Korean companies have secured a share of an actual productive lithium mine. Under 
the plan the Korean companies plan to establish a purification facility in the western part of 
the salt lake and a lithium-manufacturing plant near the city of Antofagasta by 2014 (Cho, 
16/11/2010). Also, POSCO, the world's third-biggest Korean steel producer, has focused on 
developing technology for extracting lithium and securing lithium reserves. It aims to become 
a comprehensive resource company, signing a MOU with Li3, a Peruvian firm owning a 
lithium-rich salt lake in Chile. The agreement allows POSCO’s Research Institute of 
Industrial Science and Technology (RIIST) to build a plant for lithium extraction and for 
POSCO to acquire a share of Li3 Energy, the Peruvian partner (Kim, D., 08/05/2011).  
 
The Korean companies are also seeking to secure lithium from Argentina and Bolivia by 
extending economic cooperation and sharing advanced technologies with these countries. LG 
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International Corp, Samsung C&T Corp and Daewoo International Corp have extended their efforts 
to operate in the two lithium rich countries of Argentina and Bolivia (Moon, et al., 27/08/2010).  
 
Korea's resource diplomacy and Argentina  
Although Korea established formal diplomatic relations with Argentina in 1962, a focus on 
resource diplomatic relations did not occur until the President Kim Young Sam’s visit to 
Argentina in 1996. His visit resulted in various agreements between Korea and Argentina 
such as protection of investments. The idea of promoting the expansion of exchanges and 
cooperation between Korea and South America were developed. Consequently, the Korean-
South American Cooperation Centre in Energy and natural resources was created, with its 
offices in Buenos Aires in Argentina.  In 2004, President Roh Moo-hyun visited Argentina to 
support to create a MOU between the Import and Export Korea Bank and Babco de la Nacion 
Argentina. The Bank announced a Korean loan of USD30 million to Argentinean companies 
that wished to import Korea products (Chacon, 2008: 8).  
 
Most recently, as part of Korea’s 2010 Latin America Economic Cooperation Caravan’s visit 
to Argentina, the delegation met with the Deputy Secretary of Agriculture, Livestock and 
Fisheries and the Governor of Santa Fe, and held a conference on agricultural expertise to 
confirm the possibility of putting to work the country’s rich agricultural resources and 
Korea’s technology and capital in a mutually complementary manner. Diplomatic missions 
have on the whole however concentrated on enhancing Korean companies’ capacity to import 
natural resources from Argentina including lithium.  In September in 2010, the government 
owned KORES and private companies, GS Caltex and LG international have made final 
agreements regarding a joint project on lithium development at the salt lake of Muerto in 
Argentina. This 338 square km mine is still in the initial stages of exploration; however its 
lithium reserve is estimated at 425,000 tons – which enable annual production of 12,000 tons. 
The three Korean companies own 30 percent stakes in the mine, USD15 million worth and 
exploration is underway (Chung, 06/09/2010).  
 
Korea’ Resource Diplomacy and Bolivia  
Korea and Bolivia established diplomatic relations in 1965, however Korea did not show 
significant interest in Bolivia and in 1997 closed it embassy as a cost cutting measure during 
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the Asian financial crisis. As part of the Lee Myun Bak government efforts to increase the 
number of embassies to various resource-rich countries the Korean embassy in Bolivia was 
reopened in 2008, one of five embassies reopened in 2008. After reopening the embassy, the 
Korean ambassador in Bolivia has developed close ties with the Bolivian president, Evo 
Morales (Yum, 05/03/2011). The Bolivian president’s visit to Korea in August 2010 further 
solidified the relationship between in the two countries (JoongAng Daily, 27/08/2010).    
 
The Korean government has utilised various diplomatic initiatives with a view of securing 
lithium in Bolivia. Korean business negotiators have made several visits as well as held open 
briefings and discussion sessions in an attempt to showcase Korea’s specialised technology 
that can be used to extract and process lithium. These briefings emphasised how the 
combination of the Korea’ specialised technology and investment, and Bolivia’s lithium can 
provide mutual benefits for the two countries based on developing partnership (Kang, H., 
17/08/2010). The Korean government dispatched a president’s special envoy, President Lee 
Myung-bak’s elder brother, Lee Sang-deuk, a member of the National Assembly, to Bolivia 
three times to negotiate for Korean companies’ right to develop the country’s lithium mines, 
visits that received plenty of media attention in Korea (Lee, T., 20/08/2010; Lee, E., 
27/08/2010; Kang, C., 10/09/2010; Shultz, 2010: 5). Cultural programs such as exhibitions of 
Korean music and taekwon-do were included (Kim, S., 24/06/2010).  In addition, Korea 
promised up to USD250 million in development loans to Bolivia by 2014 (Lee, T., 
26/08/2010).  
 
In August 2010 at the Korean - Bolivian summit Korean President Lee Myung-bak and 
Bolivian President Evo Morales signed an agreement which paved the way for Korean 
companies to take part in the extraction of lithium reserves under the Lake Uyuni in Bolivia 
which likely has the world’s largest reserves (Kim, S., 26/08/2010). Following the summit, 
the two state-run mineral resources corporations, KORES and La and Corporación Minera de 
Bolivia (COMIBOL) signed a MOU on research and development of technology to facilitate 
mining of the salt flats.  The two countries will also set up a joint committee to oversee a 
lithium development project to produce lithium carbonate to be suitable for use in 
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However competition between Korea, Japan, China and France to secure the right to develop 
the salt lake Lake Uyuni in Bolivia is intensifying. A state-backed Japanese firm, Japan Oil, 
Gas and Metals National Corp (JOGMEC) has also signed on a MOU with the COMIBOL to 
develop the technology needed to produce lithium carbonate in the Lake Uyuni (Achtenberg, 
12/04/2010). Under the MOU Japan will provide technology to Bolivia’s pilot programme to 
help produce lithium carbonate (Reuters, 10/11/2011). The MOUs do not guarantee that 
Korea and Japan will be entitled to extract lithium from the lake however they are important 
progress for the two countries to secure to lithium in Bolivia to diversify supply. Korea and 
Japan are the first countries to finalise MOU and secure participation in the development of 
Bolivian mines, beating France and China with these two lithium deals (Lee, T., 26/08/2010).  
 
Korea’s trading companies are highly encouraged by new business opportunities that have 
emerged since Bolivian President Morales’s Korean visit and the MOU. LG International 
Corp has set a primary goal of securing a stable supply of lithium as it has begun the lithium-
ion battery business (Moon, et al., 28/08/2010; Chung, 06/09/2010). The new battery 
business is the reason why the company has its eye on Bolivia’s lithium, following the Sal de 
Vida Lithium Brine Project, which is a joint venture to develop a lithium mine in Argentina. Also 
Japanese activities for securing lithium are encouraged by the MOU between the JOGMEC and the 
COMIBOL. A the beginning of 2011, the consortium between the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry (METI), JOGMEC and Kitakyushu University and Mitsubishi 
Corporation took the lead over other countries by acquiring the rights to participate in lithium 
extraction experiments in Bolivia. The consortium plans to begin extract experiments at a 
centre near the Uyuni Lake and to continue experiment for about one and a half years 
(Kawamoto and Tamaki, 2011: 58).  
 
However a stable supply of lithium from Bolivia is not guaranteed. Due to the increased 
competition between many companies from Korea and Japan it is likely that Bolivia’s 
negotiating position will be strengthened. A more significant obstacle is Bolivia’s state of 
development. Compared to Chile’s lithium mines, the Uyuni in Bolivia is remote and 
inaccessible, while Chile’s salt flats are served by modern roads, leading to nearby seaports. 
Moreover Bolivia is South America’s poorest country and has very poor infrastructure across 
the country (Achtenberg, 2010). The President of Battery Research Centre of LG Chem, 
currently the leading lithium-ion battery manufacturer in Korea, has warned that the 
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conditions to develop lithium resources in Bolivia remain difficult and are likely to reduce the 
economic value of developing lithium near the Lake Uyuni in Bolivia for lithium 
manufacturers in the near future (Kim, M., interview 21/02/2011). The Bolivian government 
has recognised this is an issue and committed to invest USD500 million to develop roads, 
electricity and water, gas pipelines, communications, and other basic systems.  
 
Harmonising International Development Efforts with Resource Diplomacy: Potential 
for the strategic use of ODA  
Coordinating resource diplomacy with international development efforts is an approach 
adopted, to various degrees, by others countries competing for resources, including Japan and 
China. In particular the emergence of China as a powerful player in access to, and extraction 
of, energy and resources is a key factor in reinforcing the use of aid for commercial interest 
not only in Korea but also across the donor community (Lum et al., 2008; Woods, 2008). 
However given its history, Korea is well placed to share its experience and expertise with 
developing countries and has greater capacity to being perceived as a “benign middle power” 
by recipient countries holding relevant mineral resources, and can further leverage that 
position to avoid accusations of neo-colonialism. In this case of Bolivia sensitivity to 
imperialism is an important issue. Korea and Bolivia share a colonial past and the present 
government has embraced a narrative of anti-colonial rebellion. Despite over 200 years since 
the start of its independence struggle from Spain the sense of injustice among Bolivia’s 
majority indigenous people remains deep. When Evo Morales, Bolivia's first president of 
Indian origin, was appointed in 2006 he initiated a "decolonising revolution” (Burman 2009). 
 
Korea is one of the few countries which have successfully transitioned from a recipient to a 
donor in the last two decades. It is expected that Korea will become a member of DAC 
(development assistance committee), OECD (Chun and Lee, 2009). However, one of the 
challenges Korea faces in becoming an effective contributor to development efforts in the 
region is its relatively low ODA budget. In 2009, Korea’s ODA/ GNI ratio increased to 
0.10%, still significantly lower than the OECD/DAC2 members’ average of 0.25% (OECD, 
2010). Other problems are a regional bias and a relatively large number of recipients. 
Although the share of assistance to Asia has gradually declined from 72.6% in 2001, to 61.2% 
in 2007, Korea still allocated disproportionately large amount of its ODA to Asian countries. 
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With regards to Latin America the amount has only increased incrementally to just over 11% 
in 2007 as shown in Table 3.   
 
Table 3: Regional Distribution of Korea’s ODA (2001-2007) 
(% of total net ODA) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Asia 72.6 78.3 78.5 78.2 80.9 60.5 61.2 
Africa 2.6 2.7 7.7 8.5 8.4 12.7 14.3 
Latin America 8.1 4.3 4.6 4.5 4.3 6.9 11.2 
Eastern Europe 8.0 9.2 1.2 2.1 0.7 8.3 3.4 
Oceania 2.4 0.6 2.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.8 
Unspecified 6.4 5.0 6.0 6.5 5.5 11.3 9.2 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: OECD DAC Statistics 
 
To compensate for relatively low ODA funding, the entities implementing Korea’s 
international development projects can target narrow areas in which Korea enjoys a 
comparative advantage, and maximum returns can be acquired within limited budgets. 
Strategic use of ODA is important not only for mineral extraction but infrastructure projects 
can also involve numerous “soft” components, and Korean firms engaged in international 
development consulting could complement the actual construction work with projects that 
identify ways to mitigate the social, cultural, environmental impacts – thereby aligning and 
give international breadth to its Green Growth Strategy. To do this however investment must 
be translated into an effective ODA agenda. It can also build on its “middle power” status to 
gain further legitimacy as a provider of international development, Korea can also focus on 
efficient application of its resource diplomacy.  
 
Conclusion  
Korea’s Green Growth Strategy recognises that the expansion of HEVs and EVs vehicles, 
and rechargeable-ion battery industries have the potential to realise a low carbon and green 
growth future. In this context the Korean government’s and firms’ resource diplomacy has 
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Benefiting from the FTA between Korea and Chile, a consortium led by the state-run 
resource company, KORES, has been established and a MOU between POSCO and Li3 to 
lithium develop extraction and refining technologies have been finalised. In the case of 
Argentina, the two Korean presidents’ visits to Argentina in 1996 and 2004, respectively, 
helped to facilitate Korean companies to import natural resources and develop lithium. These 
diplomatic expansions also facilitated to increase the state owned KORES’ role to lead an 
agreement with Korean private companies to develop lithium at the salt lake of Muerto in 
Argentina.   
 
The Bolivian president’s visit to Korea in August, 2010 marked a turning point in the two 
countries’ diplomatic relations to assist Korea to secure lithium in the Lake Uyuni.  Bolivian 
government has an ambition to help its people out of poverty by developing lithium. Korean 
has implemented much kind of resource diplomacy methods to secure lithium by satisfying 
Bolivia’s ambition. The Korean government held an open briefing and discussion session 
explaining Korea’s specialised technologies for maximising benefits from the lithium 
development.  Korea also shared historical pains and emphasised on enhancing partnership. 
These diplomatic efforts led to the two sides signing on a MOU to research and develop 
lithium technologies to mine the salt flats in the Lake Uyuni in Bolivia. The MOU will not 
guarantee that Korea will be entitled to extract lithium from the Lake however it is important 
progress for Korea to secure lithium in Bolivia.  
 
Nevertheless the competition between companies from Korea, Japan and other countries for 
securing the lithium is likely to intensify and barriers to the development of the Bolivian 
lithium market, in particular inadequate infrastructure, remain. If Korea is to successfully 
diversify its supplies of natural resources Korea must consider its role in these countries 
economic development. 
 
To build on these efforts resource diplomacy can be bolstered by a broader set of initiatives 
that contribute to economic construction. Korea stands as a successful model of economic 
development for developing countries and is well placed to play a role in the development of 
other countries. As such Korea can be a meaningful actor all along the hierarchy of “soft” 
development projects, from the strategic (project implementation) level to the tactical 
(behaviour change campaigns) and structural (cultural) levels. Thus it is essential to cultivate 
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a broad view of international development. To do this the government must resource agencies 
that can identify opportunities for investment such as in infrastructure and market 
development areas as well as develop programs in education, the arts, business and 
community awareness. In short to realise resource security Korea must consider reinforcing 
resource diplomacy with other deeper and more meaningful means of engagement, 
engagement that builds long-term and sustainable relationships, relationship that reject 
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